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V

IS

second

the

this

this Court vacated the trial court's judgment reforming Jeff and Karen Owen's ("Owens") deed to
include the Orphan parcel (thereby relocating the express easement). Regan v. Jeff D., 157 Idaho
758,339 P.3d 1162 (2014). This Court also reversed the trial court's alternative basis for locating
the easement on the Orphan Parcel, which stated that Brent and Moura Regan ("Regans") enjoyed
a thirty-foot prescriptive easement across the Orphan Parcel in the same location of the easement
after the reformation of the Owens' deed. Id at 1169.
Following remand, the Owens moved for summary judgment on the basis that any claim
the Regans had to a prescriptive easement across the Orphan Parcel was extinguished by the tax
sale of that parcel to Kootenai County according to LC. § 63-1009. The district court applied the
plain language of the statute to the undisputed facts presented at summary judgment and entered
judgment for the Owens.
In their appeal, Regans contend that the district court failed to read LC. § 63-1009 in pari
materia with other relevant Idaho real property statutes. Regans also claim the district court erred

in failing to consider a multitude of issues never raised by Regans below. Regans again raise in
this appeal the issue of deed reformation, which was rejected by this Court in the first appeal.
After Regans filed their notice of appeal, Senate Bill 1388, as amended, was signed into
law by Governor Otter on March 30, 2016 which altered LC. § 63-1009. This Court rejected a
stipulation from the parties this legislation did not apply to the present appeal, and required Regans
to file a supplemental brief. In their Supplemental Brief, Regans contend that Senate Bill 1388
either does not retroactively amend LC. § 63-1009 or if the bill is retroactive, its applications to
this case is unconstitutional.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Identification of Documents in the Record
On this second appeal, this Court ordered the appeal record be augmented to include the
Clerk's Record, Reporter's Transcript and Exhibits, which were electronically filed in Supreme
Cou..rt No. 40848. The record in Supreme Court No. 40848 was augmented by the appellant to
include pleadings not included even though the entire electronic clerk's record was requested on
appeal. 1 The Clerk's Record in No. 43848 only includes requested documents which duplicated
no documents in the Clerk's Record in No. 40848. As an aid to the reader of this brief, the
recitation to the various records will be as follows:
•

The Clerk's Record in No. 40848 will be identified as "40848 R" followed by the page
number;

•

The Augmented Record in No. 40848 will be identified as "40848 AR" followed by the
page number;

•

The Clerk's Record in No. 43848 will be identified as "43848 R" followed by the page
number.

B. Nature of the Case

Following remand, the remaining issue before the trial court was Regans claim of a
prescriptive easement across the Orphan Parcel. The district court determined as a matter of law
I.C. § 63-1009 was clear and unambiguous. 43848 R pp. 69-77. Applying the undisputed facts
presented at summary judgment, the trial court entered judgment for the Owens and the
prescriptive easement claim was dismissed. Id.

1 Regans recited to the augmented record in their opening brief, but did not seek to have it included in the current
appeal. It is anticipated that Regans will present an unopposed motion to include the augmented record in this
appeal.
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Regans appeal the
the majority

judgment decision and resulting final judgment However,
before

Court were not issues raised below and one

was even

decided by this Court in the first appeal. Moreover, there is no factual support in the record for
many of the new issues presented on this appeal by the Regans.
The primary issue before this Court is statutory interpretation.

The district court

determined the statute was unambiguous as written. Regans ask this Court to vacate the district
court's final judgment because they believe the result of such an approach was not intended by the
legislature. However, the district court properly acted within its power and authority in deciding
the summary judgment and entering its final judgment.

C. Course of Proceedings
The Regans provide this Court a creative rendition of the facts in the case. This response
clarifies and supplements some of those aspects.
On March 11, 2011, Regans filed a complaint in Kootenai County alleging: ( 1) interference
with express easement rights across the north 30' of the Owen's parcel claimed to benefit four
separate parcels of property; (2) interference with an implied easement across the Orphan Parcel
for the benefit of four parcels of property; (3) a request to reform the Owens' deed to adjust the
north property boundary to encompass the Orphan Parcel for the benefit of four parcels of property
owned by Regan, and (4) a claim that Regan established a prescriptive easement across a portion
of the Orphan Parcel which benefitted the same four parcels of property. 40848 R pp. 14-22. On
April 19, the Owens answered the complaint and admitted the existence of the express easement
for the benefit of Parcel II only and denied the remaining claims. 40848 R. pp. 71-74; 40848 AR
pp. 163-171.
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On September 1, 2011, Regan moved for partial summary judgment, with supporting
affidavits and memorandum, to declare the existence of the express easement across the Owen
parcel and the right to develop it for road and utility purposes for the benefit of all four parcels
identified in the complaint. 40848 AR pp. 142-162. The Owens filed a response to the Regans'
motion on September 15, 2011, acknowledging Parcel II described in the complaint was benefittcd
by the express easement and alleging the remaining parcels were not entitled to the benefit of the
express easement. 40848 AR pp. 163-171. The court entered an order on September 29, 2011,
granting summary judgment regarding Parcel II only. 40848 R pp. 76-80. Thereafter, Regan
engaged a contractor to develop a road across the north 30' of the Owens' parcel. The work done
comprised grubbing and clearing the easement, widening it, removing at least four large trees and
brush from the easement, and bringing in road base material. 40848 AR pp. 181,243,255, 301;
408485/31/12PreliminaryHearingTrp.152,ll.2-19, 158,11.9-15,24-25; 159,11. 1-6;p.160,ll.
14-22;p.102,l.25,p.163,p.164,l.1-4; 178,11.23-25, 179-180.
On October 27, 2011, the Regans moved for a preliminary injunction and for a finding of
contempt against the Owens, with supporting affidavits and a notice of hearing of the contempt
charge (which did not comply with I.R.C.P. 75). 40848 AR pp. 172-215. The contempt was based
upon the Owens calling the sheriff when the Regans' contractor, upon direction by Brent Regan,
dumped the debris from the road construction outside the easement in the Owens' front yard. Id.
On March 16, 2012, Owen moved for leave to amend their pleadings to add a counterclaim
for trespass based upon the Regans' contractor dumping the construction debris outside the
boundaries of the easement onto their front yard at Brent Regan's direction. 40848 AR pp. 326336. Ultimately, the Regans dismissed their contempt claim and made an offer of judgment on the
trespass claim, which was accepted. 40848 AR 686-687; 40848 R pp. 113-115.
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Following remand, on August 7, 2015, Owens filed their third motion for summary
judgment arguing that the Regans' claim for prescriptive easement was extinguished by issuance
of the tax deed. 43848 R pp. 23-35. Regans opposed the motion based on foreign law, policy
arguments, and evidence from the Kootenai County Treasurer targeted at material facts according
to the foreign law they requested the trial court adopt. 43848 R pp. 36-60.
The district court heard oral argument on Owens' third motion for summary judgment on
September 4, 2015. 43848 Tr. pp. 1-26. The district court issued a written decision on the motion
for summary judgment on October 9, 2015, granting summary judgment for Owens based on the
application of LC. § 63-1009 to the undisputed material facts presented to the district court. 43848
R pp. 69-77. A final judgment, prepared by Regans' counsel, was entered on October 30, 2015,
which included return of the Regans' preliminary injunction bond to them. 43848 R pp. 78-80.
This judgment was followed by an amended final judgment entered December 17, 2015 which
released the bond to the Owens. 43848 R pp. 86-88. The Regans appealed the original final
judgment on December 10, 2015, and filed an amended notice of appeal on January 27, 2016.
43848 R. pp. 81-85, 90-94.
After the appeal was filed, and Regans submitted their opening brief, Senate Bill 1388, as
amended, was signed into law by Governor Otter on March 30, 2016, amending LC. § 63-1009 to
specifically state that a conveyance by tax sale only conveys title free of liens and mortgages of a
monetary nature if proper notice was sent to the party in interest. LC.§ 63-1009 (amended March
30, 2016). 2 This amendment removed the prior language of "encumbrances." On June 27, 2016,
Regans filed a Supplemental Brief addressing whether the 2016 amendment had retroactive

Unless otherwise specifically indicated herein, all references in this brief to I.C. § 63-1009 refer to the statute prior
to its amendment in 2016.
2
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application as applied to
§ 63-1009 or if the

not
IS

D. Statement of the Facts
This Court already knows of the underlying facts of this case from the first appeal and the
additional relevant facts for this appeal are as follows:
On May 27, 2015, Owens' counsel deposed Brent Regan and asked him if his prescriptive
easement enhanced the value of the Orphan Parcel:
Q. Does the access road enhance the value of your property?
A Yes.
Q. Does it enhance the value of the Owen's parcel?
A Couldn't say.
Q. How does it enhance the value of your property?
A By giving me access to Bonnell Road.
Q. And isn't it true you have an express easement across the Owen parcel that gives
access to Bonnell Road?
A Yes.

43848 R p. 33, L. 11-20. Brent Regan did not claim the prescriptive easement added any value to
the Orphan Parcel. By affidavit dated August 7, 2015, Jeff Owen testified that an easement across
the Orphan Parcel: 1) is not essential to the Owens' use and enjoyment of the land; 2) detracted
from the Owens' use and enjoyment because of increased traffic and prevented them from freely
using their land; and 3) did not enhance the value of the land, but instead diminished it. 43848 R
pp. 28-29.
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ADDITIONAL ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL

1.

Whether Owens are entitled to an award of reasonable attorney fees on appeaL

ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL

The Owens request an award ofreasonable attorney fees on appeal pursuant to LC. §§ 12121, 12-123(2)(a), and I.AR. 41. Idaho statute provides this Court with discretion to award
attorney fees to a prevailing party:
In any civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing
party or parties, provided that this section shall not alter, repeal or amend any statute
which otherwise provides for the award of attorney's fees.
LC. § 121. By rule the Idaho Supreme Court has limited the application of this discretionary award
to instances where the Court finds "that the case was brought, pursued or defended
frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation." IRCP 54(e)(1 ). An award of attorney fees under
LC. § 12-121 is appropriate when "the Court is left with the abiding belief that the appeal was
brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation." Chavez v. Barrus,
146 Idaho 212, 225, 192 P.3d 1036, 1049 (2008). The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure do not
define or provide explanation of whether a case is "brought, pursued or defended frivolously,
unreasonable or without foundation," but is within the broad and sound discretion of the Court.
Anderson v. Goodlijfe, 140 Idaho 446, 449, 95 P.3d 64, 67 (2004). Historically this Court has
refused to exercise its discretion in awarding attorney fees under LC. § 12-121 if the losing party
has presented at least on legitimate issue, even when their other "factual or legal claims [were]
frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation." Michalkv. Michalk, 148 Idaho 224,235,220 P.3d
580, 591 (2009). However, recently this Court has held that "[a]pportionrnent of attorney fees is
appropriate for those elements of the case that were frivolous, unreasonable, and without
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foundation." Idaho Military Historical

Inc. v. Maslen, 156 Idaho 624,

P.3d 1072,

Besides LC. § 1 121, this Court "may award reasonable attorney's fees to any party to that
action adversely affected by frivolous conduct." LC.§ 12-123(2)(a). Frivolous conduct is defined
as follows:
"Frivolous conduct" means conduct of a party to a civil action or of his counsel of
record that satisfies either of the following:
(i) It obviously serves merely to harass or maliciously injure another party to the
civil action;
(ii) It is not supported in fact or warranted under existing law and cannot be
supported by a good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of
existing law.
LC.§ I2-123(1)(b).
In this case, the Regans' claim of prescriptive easement was the only issue remaining after
this Court's remand on the first appeal. Despite the narrow scope of the remand and the limited
proceedings following the remand and leading up to this appeal, the Regans now present a litany
of issues to this Court on appeal that were: 1) never raised below, 2) decided on the first appeal,
or 3) are not supported by the record. The only issues the Regans properly raise before this Court
are 1) whether the district court erred in interpreting and applying I.C. § 63-1009, 2) whether the
2016 amendment of LC. § 63-1009 should be applied retroactively, and 3) whether Regans are
entitled to costs and attorney fees if they prevail on appeal.
Regans agree on appeal that the amendment to LC. § 63-1009 does not apply to this case,
so this issue is not pursued by them on appeal. Regan's claims of error by the district court are
frivolous and without foundation, mostly because they were never raised below. Because Regans'
appeal is without merit, this Court should award Owens their reasonable attorney fees on appeal.
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ARGUMENT
L

STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court's review of a decision on summary judgment is the same standard used by the

district court. Ada Cty. Bd of Equalization v. Highlands, Inc., 141 Idaho 202, 205-06, 108 P.3d
349, 352-53 (2005). "Summary judgment is appropriate if there are no genuine issues of material
fact and the case can be decided as a matter oflaw." Id.; I.R.C.P. 56(c). Interpreting a statute is a
question of law over which this Court exercises free review. State v. Maidwell, 137 Idaho 424,
426, 50 P.3d 439,441 (2002). This Court also exercises free review over constitutional questions.
CDA Dairy Queen, Inc. v. State Ins. Fund, 154 Idaho 379,382,299 P.3d 186, 189 (2013).

II.

THE 2016 AMENDMENT OF I.C. § 63-1009 SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED
RETROACTIVELY IN THIS CASE
After this appeal was filed, the legislature passed legislation intended to abrogate Owens'

vested property rights acquired in the tax deed issued to them pursuant to LC. § 63-1009. Since
determination of this issue could be dispositive, it is addressed first in this response.
While it is uncommon for the Respondents to agree with Appellants' argument on appeal,
Owens agree with Regans' conclusion that the 2016 amendment of LC. § 63-1009 should not apply
retroactively to the facts of this case. However, Owens arrives at their conclusion based on a
different analysis of the applicable law.
Effective March 30, 2016, LC.§ 63-1009 was amended to read as follows:
EFFECT OF TAX DEED AS CONVEYANCE. The deed conveys to the grantee
the right, title, and interest held by the record owner or owners, provided that the
title conveyed by the deed shall be free of any recorded purchase contract,
mortgage, deed of trust, security interest, lien, or lease, so long as notice has been
sent to the party in interest as provided in sections 63-201(17) and 63-1005, Idaho
Code, and the lien for property taxes, assessments, charges, interest, and penalties
for which the lien is foreclosed and in satisfaction of which the property is sold.
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§ 63-1009 (2016). The plain language of this amended statute clearly does not provide for the
conveyance

property by tax deed free and clear of the encumbrances that the prior statute

contemplated. Under the plain language of the amended statute, a prescriptive easement would
survive conveyance of the servient estate by tax deed. Regans contend this amended statute is not
expressly intended to apply retroactively to past conveyances. Supplemental Brief, pp. 5-13.
Owens respectfully disagree with Regans' analysis. However, Owens agree with Regans' ultimate
conclusion that retroactive application of the amended statute would violate both the United States
and Idaho Constitutions.

A.

Senate Bill 1388 is Expressly Retroactive

A statute is retroactive when it "changes the legal effect of previous transactions or events."

Stuart v. State, 149 Idaho 35, 43, 232 P.3d 813, 821 (2010) (citing Engen v. James, 92 Idaho 690,
695, 448 P.2d 977, 982 (1969)). The Idaho Supreme Court has held that purchasers of property
from the county acquire vested rights to that property. Washington County v. Paradis, 38 Idaho
364,369,222 P. 775, 777 (1923). If the rights vested in a purchaser are subsequently changed by
legislation, that legislation is retroactive.
Retroactive legislation in Idaho is prohibited unless there is express legislative intent for
retroactive application: "No part of these compiled laws is retroactive, unless expressly so
declared." LC.§ 73-101; Hillv. Am. Family Mut. Jns. Co., 150 Idaho 619,628,249 P.3d 812,821
(2011) (no statute is retroactive unless the Legislature expressly declares that it is); Johnson v.

Stoddard, 96 Idaho 230, 234, 526 P.2d 835, 839 (1974) (no law in Idaho will be applied
retroactively absent a clear legislative intent to that effect). Enacting language of the legislature
that "clearly refers to the past as well as to the future" manifests a clear "intent to make the law
retroactive." Guzman v. Piercy, 155 Idaho 928, 938, 318 P.3d 918, 928 (2014) citing Peavy v.
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Idaho

(19

legislation at

16.

2016 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 273 § 8 at 758, eff. Mar. 30, 2016 (hereinafter cited as "Senate Bill
1388"). Section 8 of Senate Bill 1388, which deals with application of the act, states: "Being a
clarification of existing law, the Legislature does not view the application of this amendment to
prior conveyances as retroactive legislation." Senate Bill 1388, § 8. Relying solely on this sentence
alone it would appear that the Legislature did not intend the amendment of LC. § 63-1009 (also
referred to as "the amended statute") to apply retroactively. However, that sentence is at odds with
the next sentence of Section 8, which states: "In any event, the Legislature expressly intends that
these amendments shall be interpreted to apply to any and all conveyances by tax deed, past or
future." Id. (emphasis added). Apparently the first sentence was an expression by the Legislature
on how it would rule upon the statute were it a court.
A review of the statutory language in its totality leads to the conclusion that the Idaho

Legislature did intend the amended statute to apply retroactively. "In any event" is similar to saying
"regardless"

or

"nevertheless."

In

any

event,

OXFORD

DICTIONARY,

http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/in-any-event (last visited 11 July, 2016). By
using the words "in any event," the Legislature meant to disregard the first sentence of Section 8
of the Bill exclaiming its view that the legislation was not meant to be retroactive, and say instead
that the legislation applied retroactively, to past conveyances.
The effect of applying the statute retroactively would be retroactive legislation because it
would change the vested rights of Owens as purchasers from the county. When the Orphan Parcel
was conveyed to Owens in 2005 by tax deed, Owens obtained a vested right to the real property,
free of the claim of a prescriptive easement. 43848 R pp. 73-76. Now with the passage of
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subsequent legislation, that vested right is purportedly changed to ovvnership subject to a claim of
a prescriptive easement. Application of the amended statute to the title vested in Owens by the tax
deed conveyance retroactively changes the Owens' vested rights and imposes new legal
obligations and duties on them (i.e. those of a servient estate) that were not in effect under the
previous legislation. Because application of the amended statute to the title held by Owens changes
their vested rights in the Orphan it is retroactive legislation. Stuart, 149 Idaho at 43, 232 P.3d at
821. Having found the amended statute is retroactive legislation, this Court should then find the
amended version of § 63-1009 impermissibly violates both the United States and the Idaho
Constitutions when applied to this case.
B.

Retroactive Application of the Amended Statute is Unconstitutional

Retroactively applying the amended statute to the tax deed conveyance of the Orphan
Parcel is unconstitutional because it impairs the vested rights that contract conveyed to Owens
without serving an important public purpose. Article I, § 10, cl. 1 of the United States Constitution
states: "No State shall ... pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the
Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. Article I §
16 of the Idaho Constitution similarly states: "No .. .law impairing the obligation of contracts shall
ever be passed." IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 16.
In Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co. v. Bashor, 36 Idaho 818,822,214 P. 209,213 (1923),
the Idaho Supreme Court defined what it meant for a law to impair the obligations of contracts:
"The obligation of a contract is impaired by a statute which alters its terms, by imposing new
conditions or dispensing with existing conditions, or which adds new duties or releases or lessens
any part of the contractual obligation or substantially defeats its ends." Id.
Statutory interference with contract is not a per se violation of the constitutions, but must

first be evaluated under a three-step framework applicable to both the United States and Idaho
constitutions:
The first step is to determine whether the challenged legislative enactment "has
operated as a substantial impairment of a contractual relationship." This threshold
inquiry also has three parts: 1) whether a contractual relationship exists, 2) whether
the challenged legislative enactment impairs that relationship, and 3) whether that
impairment is substantial ... lf the chailenged legislative action is found to
substantially impair a contract, the analysis then proceeds to the remaining two
steps: whether the act serves "an important public purpose," and whether the act is
"reasonable and necessary" to advance that purpose.
CDA Dairy Queen, Inc. v. State Ins. Fund, 154 Idaho 379, 383-88, 299 P.3d 186, 190-95 (2013).
1.

Retroactive Application of the Amended Statute is a Substantial
Impairment of the Contractual Relationship

Retroactive application of the amended statute is a substantial impairment of the contract
between Owens and Kootenai County because there was a contract promising Owens absolute title
free and clear of all encumbrances. The new legislation creates an encumbrance on the property3
which decreases the value of the Orphan Parcel. There is no question in Idaho that the law in
effect when property is conveyed by tax deed becomes contractual terms between the county and
the purchaser:
Questions concerning the effect of a tax sale as a transfer of title, or the rights of
the purchaser and the validity of his title, are to be determined by the law in force
at the time the sale was made, which law indeed constitutes a contract between the
county and the purchaser, the terms of which cannot be impaired by subsequent
legislation.
Larson v. Gilderoy, 45 Idaho 764, 267 P. 234, 235 (1928). "The laws which subsist at the time

and place of the making of a contract ... enter into and form a part of it." CDA Dairy Queen, 154
Idaho at 388,299 P.3d at 195 (quoting Gen. Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 188 (1992)).
Indeed, conveyance of real property by tax deed is a "contract which cannot be impaired by

3

Assuming arguendo that Regans can prove the necessary elements of a prescriptive easement claim.
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legislative enactment, the purchaser from the county having acquired a vested right Paradis, 38
Idaho at 369,222 P. at 777. Accordingly, when Owens purchased the Orphan Parcel, the terms of
that contract with the county included the law of LC.§ 63-1009 as it then existed, which said that
Owens received absolute title free of all encumbrances.
The next question is whether the chailenged legislative act impairs the contractual
relationship. Id. at 387, 299 P.3d at 194. "To impair a contract is to 'diminish the value of' the
contract." Id. at 388,299 P.3d at 195 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 819 (Bryan A. Gardner ed.,
9th ed., West 2009)). As noted in the statement of facts, Owens testified by affidavit that a
prescriptive easement across the Orphan Parcel would diminish its value.
Lastly:
If the court determines that a legislative act has impaired a contract, the final step
in the threshold inquiry is to decide whether the contractual impairment is
substantial. In making this determination, courts consider several factors, such as
whether the impairment eliminates an important contractual right, defeats an
expectation of the parties, or creates a significant financial hardship for one party.
CDA Dairy Queen, 154 Idaho at 388-89, 299 P.3d at 195-96. In United States Trust Co. of New
York v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 9-10, 18-19 (1977), the United States Supreme Court determined
the repeal of a statute which protected the interests of bondholders constituted a substantial
impairment to the contract between bondholders and the states, holding the retroactive repeal
eliminated an important security provision. A case decided by the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit explained "when considering substantial impairment, we focus on the
importance of the term which is impaired, not the dollar amount." S. Cal. Gas Co. v. City of Santa
Ana, 336 F.3d 885, 892 (9th Cir. 2003). The fees charged under the amended statute in S. Cal Gas
Co. "impair[ed] a right at the heart of the [contract]." Id.
There is no question that the quality of the title conveyed to Owens by tax deed is an
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important right

that contract. Whether Owens receive an unencumbered piece of real property
important contractual right.

versus property subject to an easement is

Similar to the

contractual provision in S. Cal. Gas Co., which was at the heart of the contract, the right to take
title free of all encumbrances is at the heart of the conveyance between the Owens and Kootenai
County. Moreover, retroactively burdening that property with an easement substantially impairs
the value of the contract to the Owens. 43 848 R p. 29. Retroactive application also creates new
duties restricting the Owens free use of their property, and casting them in the position of a servient
estate. These are substantial impairments of their contractual rights.
2.

Retroactive Application of the Amended Statute in this Case does not
Serve an Important Public Purpose

Because the challenged legislative action substantially impairs the Owens' contract, the
analysis must turn to the remaining stops outlined in CDA Dairy Queen, Inc. v. State Ins. Fund,
supra.

In determining "whether the act serves an important public purpose" this Court has

explained "substantial impairment may be permissible where there is a 'significant and legitimate
public purpose behind the regulation, such as the remedying of a broad and general social or
economic problem."' CDA Dairy Queen, 154 Idaho at 388, 299 P.3d at 195 (quoting Energy
Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400,411 (1983)).

This Court should find there was not a legitimate and important public purpose behind the
broad retroactive application of the amended statute. The Senate claimed allowing the original

I. C. § 63-1009 to pass absolute title to the land free of all encumbrances would "result in the
elimination of public utility easements, ditch rights, public highways and rights-of-way,
conservation easements, and all manner of third-party rights in the land." Senate Bill 1388, § 1.
This is not only an overstatement of the supposed public policy problem, it is inaccurate.
While it is true the original LC. § 63-1009 could eliminate certain third party property
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rights, it only did so if the third party rights were an "encumbrance" to the land. An easement is
an encumbrance if it impairs the

and usefulness

public

way and utility easements are not encumbrances because they benefit the land over which they
cross. See Hunt v. Bremer, 47 Idaho 490, 276 P. 964, 965 (1929) (public easements, public rights
of way, and irrigation canals are not encumbrances). See also Newmeyer v. Roush, 21 Idaho 106,
120 P. 464 (1912) (a public right of way is not an encumbrance); Schurger v. Moorman, 20 Idaho
97, 117 P. 122 (1911) (an irrigation canal is not an encumbrance); Campagna v. Parker, 116 Idaho
734, 779 P.2d 409 (1989) (public easements, or easements beneficially affecting the land, do not
constitute encumbrances within the meaning of the covenant against encumbrances). Seemingly
the legislature was unaware of this long standing case law when expressing its fears.
The United States Supreme Court has held that the public is best served by predictability
and stability regarding their contractual rights and responsibilities: "The largest category of cases
in which we have applied the presumption against statutory retroactivity has involved new
provisions affecting contractual or property rights, matters in which predictability and stability
are of prime importance. Landgraf v. US! Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 271 (1994). Indeed,

with respect to the amended statute before the Court, the public would be better served by
application of the amended statute prospectively only and not altering prior contractual rights.
Thus, there is no important public purpose in interfering with private contractual rights since the
public easements the Senate expressed concern about losing were already safe under the existing
case law.
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3.

The Amended Statute is
Important Public Purpose

Reasonable and Necessary to Advance an

With the final step of analysis "the Court must still determine whether the act is based
'upon reasonable conditions and [is] of a character appropriate to the public purpose justifying its
adoption."' CDA Dairy Queen, 154 Idaho at 388,299 P.3d at 195 (quoting United States Trust Co.

ofNew Yorkv. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 22 (1977)). The amended statute is too broad, and instead
of protecting only those important public rights it seeks to preserve, it also interferes with private
contractual rights.
To be a reasonable and necessary retroactive legislation, the amended statute should simply
have limited its retroactive application to public easements or rights benefitting the public, rather
than all non-monetary interests in land, including private easements. There is a strong public
policy against interference with contracts that requires those private contractual rights not be
tampered with retroactively.
As United States Supreme Court Justice Scalia stated in Landgraf "the largest category of
cases in which we have 'applied the presumption against statutory retroactivity ... involved new
provisions effecting contractual or property rights, matters in which predictability and stability are
of prime importance."' Landgraf 511 U.S. at 271. It is much more important for this Court to
recognize a policy of encouraging stability and predictability in the execution of contractual and
property rights, rather than upset the longstanding presumption that the laws in existence at the
time of the execution of the contract enter into the contract itself. To apply the amended version
of LC. § 63-1009 retroactively would upset the vested rights of persons who have acquired
property in the State of Idaho through tax deed conveyances, including the Owens.

Most

importantiy, it was not reasonable or necessary for the Legislature to interfere with these private
contractual rights to protect the public rights over which it was concerned. The amended statute
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is too broad and should have been more narrowly tailored to address the important public purpose
such a need really

The more appropriate resolution of the Legislature's supposed public

policy emergency would be for the amended LC. § 63-1009 to apply prospectively to future
transactions by tax deed. This would allow the Legislature's intentions to shape the future of tax
deed conveyances without destroying the vested and bargained-for rights of current property
owners like the Owens.
The act as written was not reasonable and necessary to advance its stated purpose. To
prevent the Owens from being deprived of their vested rights under the version of LC. § 63-1009
by which they took title, the Court must interpret the amended LC. § 63-1009 as impermissibly
retroactive legislation under the facts and circumstances of the present case. The contractual tax
deed conveyance from Kootenai County to the Owens must be governed by the former version of
LC. § 63-1009, the law in force at the time of the contract. To hold otherwise would violate the
Idaho Constitution and the United States Constitution.

III.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN DETERMINING THAT THE
REGANS' PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT WAS AN ENCUMBRANCE
EXTINGUISHED BY TAX SALE OF THE ORPHAN PARCEL
The district court properly applied LC. § 63-1009 when it determined "[i]t is undisputed

that the Regans' claim of a prescriptive easement would constitute an encumbrance upon Owens'
land they received from the county after it was acquired by tax deed" and dismissed the Regans'
claim for a prescriptive easement. 43848 R pp. 75-76, 86-87. Idaho Code Section 63-1009 states
the grantee of real property by tax deed receives "absolute title to the land described therein, free
of all encumbrances," with exception for mortgages, subsequent property tax liens, and liens for
special assessments, none of which are relevant to the issue before the Court. LC.§ 63-1009. The
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district court correctly interpreted "encumbrances" to include the Regans' alleged prescriptive
easement across the Orphan Parcel.
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which this Court exercises free
review. Maidwell, 137 Idaho at 426, 50 P.3d at 441. The goal of statutory interpretation is to
ascertain legislative intent. State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863, 866, 264 P.3d 970, 973 (2011).
Therefore, interpretation of a statute begins with the literal words of the statute. State v. Burnight,
132 Idaho 654, 659, 978 P.2d 214, 219 (1999). The words of the statute should be given their
plain, usual, and ordinary meanings, giving effect to all the words and provisions of the statute.
Id.; LC. § 73-113(1). "When the statutory language is unambiguous, courts must give effect to

the legislature's clearly expressed intent without engaging in statutory construction." Saint
Alphonsus Reg'! ivied. Ctr. v. Gooding Cty., 159 Idaho 84,356 P.3d 377, 379-80 (2015) (emphasis

added); LC. § 73-113(1). Where a statute is unambiguous, its plain language controls and this
Court will not engage in statutory construction. Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg'l Med. Ctr., 151
Idaho 889, 893, 265 P.3d 502, 506 (2011). This Court does not have the authority to revise a
statute that is unambiguous as written "on the ground that it is patently absurd or would produce
absurd results when construed as written." Id. at 896, 265 P.3d at 509.
A statute is only ambiguous where the language is capable of more than one reasonable
construction. Porter v. Bd. of Trs., Preston Sch. Dist. No. 201, 141 Idaho 11, 14, 105 P.3d 671,
674 (2004). "Ambiguity is not established merely because differing interpretations are presented
to a court; otherwise, all statutes subject to litigation would be considered ambiguous." Id. If a
statute is not ambiguous, "this Court does not construe it, but simply follows the law as written."
State v. Thiel, 158 Idaho 103, 108, 343 P.3d 1110, 1115 (2015) (internal quotations omitted).

When a statute is unambiguous, there is no reason to consult legislative history or other extrinsic
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evidence "for the purpose of altering the clearly expressed intent of the legislature." City of Sun
v. Sun Valley Co., 123 Idaho 665, 667, 851 P.2d 961, 963 (1993).

In this case, the district court correctly held that LC. § 63-1009 is clear and unambiguous.
The district court correctly applied the statute as written when it held that the Owens took title to
the Orphan Parcel free of the Regans' prescriptive easement claim. The district court also correctly
rejected argument that the statute should be applied contrary to its plain language.
A.

Idaho Code Section 63-1009 is Not Ambiguous

Neither below, nor on appeal, have the Regans attempted to argue that the language of LC.
§ 63-1009 is ambiguous. The Regans conceded to the trial court that the statute is unambiguous:
"The statute is problematic, we admit that. It says what it says, that a tax deed conveys absolute
title fee of all encumbrances with certain specific exceptions." 43848 Summary Judgment Tr pp.
11, L. 21-24.
On appeal, the Regans simply argue this Court should interpret the terms "absolute title"
and "encumbrances" differently because the result would be more favorable to them and perhaps
others. Appellant's Opening Brief, 16-1 7, 30. However, Regans' requests ignore the plain, usual,
and ordinary meanings of these terms and violate the rules of statutory interpretation. Idaho Code
Section 63-1009 is not ambiguous and was correctly applied by the district court.
According to Section 63-1009, a conveyance of real property by tax deed "conveys to the
grantee the absolute title to the land therein; free of all encumbrances ... " I.C. § 63-1009 does not
define "absolute title" or "encumbrances," nor does Title 63 of the Idaho Code. Since absolute
title and encumbrances are not specifically defined they should be given their "plain, usual, and
ordinary meaning[s]." Burnight, 132 Idaho at 659, 978 P.2d at 219. The Court can ascertain a
word's plain, usual, and ordinary meaning by reference to a legal dictionary. See Hayes v. City of
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Plummer, 159 Idaho 168,

provided the

1

1

(2015) (The Court's use of Black's

Dictionary

with
1.

The Plain, Usual, and Ordinary Meaning of "Absolute Title" Means a
Fee Simple Interest

Absolute title is defined as "[ aln exclusive title to land; a title that excludes all others not
compatible with it. See fee simple absolute under FEE SIMPLE." Black's Law Dictionary 1622
(Bryan A. Gardner ed., 9th ed., West 2009). Fee simple absolute is defined as "[a]n estate of
indefinite or potentially infinite duration" and a fee simple is defined as "the broadest property
interest allowed by law." Black's Law Dictionary 691 (Bryan A. Gardner ed., 9th ed., West 2009).
Absolute title is not defined in Idaho statute. However, absolute title is synonymous in Idaho case
law with fee simple or fee simple absolute title in real property. See Argyle v. Slemaker, 99 Idaho
544,548,585 P.2d 954,958 (1978) (mvnership ofreal property redundantly described as "absolute
title in fee simple"). Absolute title is often used in Idaho case law to contrast fee simple ownership
with title held merely as a security for an obligation. See State v. Snyder, 71 Idaho 454, 460, 233
P .2d 802, 806 (1951) (court determined that execution and delivery of bill of sale was not
conveyance of absolute title but a form of security for a loan).
There is no argument presented by Regans that absolute title means anything other than fee
simple absolute ownership of real property. In fact, that is in essence the definition the Regans
request this Court adopt: "the term 'absolute title' in Idaho Code section 63-1009 is most logically
defined as a title to property that cannot be divested by the occurrence of a future event."
Appellants' Opening Brief, 30 (emphasis added).
While recognizing the broadness of the definition of absolute title, the Regans fail to give
effect to the remaining plain language of the statute and fail to recognize the "absolute title"
conveyed by the statute is further modified as "free of all encumbrances." LC.§ 63-1009. That is
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language the district court focused on when it determined the quality of the fee simple
ownership the Owens received when they were issued a tax deed from the County. The district
court never defined "absolute title" in its memorandum decision or final judgment, so it is puzzling
how the Regans can claim "the trial court erred in ruling that the phrase 'absolute title' in Idaho
Code section 63-1009 means title free from a prescriptive easement." Appellants' Opening Brief,
32; compare 43848 R p. 69-76, 86-87. On appeal Regans never provide this Court with a citation
to the record where the district court defined "absolute title" to mean something that is mutually
exclusive of real property burdened by a prescriptive easement. The district court never made such
a pronouncement.
The question before the district court was whether the conveyed fee simple
ownership was burdened by a prescriptive easement claim which survived the issuance of the tax
deed.

The most important part of the statute for the case at hand is what constitutes an

encumbrance, and whether the Regans' alleged prescriptive easement was an encumbrance under
LC. § 63-1009. As discussed below, the district court correctly determined that the Regans'
prescriptive easement was an encumbrance because it was an interest in land that was not essential
to Owens' enjoyment and did not increase the value of the Orphan Parcel.
2.

The Term "Encumbrances" in I.C. § 67-1009 included the Regans'
Claim of a Prescriptive Easement over the Orphan Parcel

The Regans invite this Court to limit the meaning of an encumbrance to only those which
secure financial interests. Appellants' Opening Brief, p. 16. This Court has addressed the meaning
of an encumbrance on more than one occasion in cases related to the warranty of title and covenant
against encumbrances. As early as 1912, this Court held a reserved access easement in a deed was
an encumbrance. Newmyer v. Roush, 21 Idaho 106, 116-117, 120 P. 464 (1912). The Court
reasoned that such an easement is an encumbrance because it is a right that "clearly impair[ sJ the

and usefulness of said tract, and the right to the use was not granted for the purpose of
benefiting

land itself or increasing its value." Id.

Later in 1929, the Idaho Supreme Court addressed the definition of encumbrances found
in C. S. § 5385, the statutory predecessor of LC. § 55-613, with identical language as§ 55-613
today, and held "[a]side from these statutory provisions [LC. § 55-613], an incumbrance may
otherwise be defined to be any right or interest in land to the diminution of its value, but consistent
with the free transfer of the fee ... [and] embraces all cases in which the owner does not acquire the
complete dominion over the land which his grant apparently implies." Hunt v. Bremer, 47 Idaho
490, 276 P. 964, 965 (1929) ( emphasis added). Simply put, an encumbrance is "a right or interest
which diminishes the value of the land." Id. The Hunt Court qualified and narrowed its definition
to exclude those rights that are essential to the land's enjoyment and enhance the land's value. Id.
Examples of essential or value enhancing "encumbrances" include public easements, public rights
of way, and irrigation canals. Id. The holding from Hunt is that any interest in real property less
than a fee simple interest is an encumbrance unless the interest is essential to the enjoyment of the
land and enhances the land's value. That general definition was applied to an easement as follows:
It is apparent that, if an incumbrance is a right or interest which diminishes the
value of the land, no easement or other right should be regarded as an incumbrance,
which is essential to its enjoyment and by which its value is enhanced. The modem
trend, now firmly established, is that the existence of certain public easements, or
easements beneficially affecting the land, such as a public road right of way
(Newmyer v. Roush, 21 Idaho, 106, 120 P. 464, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 433) or canal
(Schurger v. Moorman, 20 Idaho, 97, 117 P. 122, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 313, Ann. Cas.
1912D, 1114), do not constitute incumbrances, within the meaning of covenants
against incumbrances.

Id.
In Hoffer v. Callister, 137 Idaho 291, 47 P.3d 1261 (2002), the Hoffer Court specifically
addressed LC. § 55-613 and the meaning of the term "encumbrances" in the context of a zoning
violation notice.

The Hoffer Court held the statute is inclusive, rather than exclusive, in its

meaning and cited Hunt v. Bremer, 47 Idaho 490,276 P. 964 (1929) as authority for the proposition
there are other types of encumbrances that aren't listed in the statute. Id. at 294, 47 P.3d at 1264.
The Hoffer Court also cited to Kaelker v. Turnbull, 127 Idaho 262, 265-66, 899 P.2d 972, 975-76
(1995) (holding that the covenant of title is breached when there are hostile titles, superior in fact
to those of the grantor.) Id. The Hoffer Court concluded "[a]s the language from these cases
makes clear, an encumbrance that does not fit within one of the categories enumerated in LC. §
55-613 must be a right, interest, or hostile title relating to the land.

Id. The Hoffer Court also

cited with approval the holding from Hunt v. Bremer, supra, that "an encumbrance may otherwise
be defmed by any right or interest in land to the diminution of its value, but consistent with the
free transfer of the fee. It does not depend upon the extent or amount of diminution in value, but
embraces all cases in which the owner does not acquire the complete dominion over the land which
his grant apparently implies." Id. The prescriptive easement claimed by the Regans fits this
definition. It is an interest in the land that diminishes its value.
Most recently in 2014, in the first appeal of this case, this Court again approved the
definition of encumbrance found in Hunt:
An encumbrance is "any right or interest in land to the diminution of its value, but
consistent with the free transfer of the fee." Hunt v. Bremer, 47 Idaho 490,494,276
P. 964, 965 (1929). Whether something is an encumbrance does not depend upon
the extent to which it diminishes the value of the land. An encumbrance "embraces
all cases in which the owner does not acquire the complete dominion over the land
which his grant apparently implies." Id An easement is not an encumbrance if the
easement is essential to the enjoyment of the land and it enhances the land's value.
Id There is no finding by the district court that the alleged prescriptive easement
across the Orphan Parcel increased its value.

Regan v. Owen, 157 Idaho 758, 765, 339 P.3d 1162, 1169 (2014). The definition found in Hunt
follows Newmyer and Hoffer, supra, and I. C. § 55-613. Therefore, the definition of encumbrances

as used in LC. § 63-1009 includes easements that are not essential to the enjoyment of the land
and do not enhance the land's value.
A statute is only ambiguous where the language is capable of more than one reasonable
construction. Porter, 141 Idaho at 14, 105 P.3d at 674 (emphasis added).

All constructions

proposed by Regans conflict with the plain language of the statute and Idaho case law, and are
unreasonable. When a statute is unambiguous, it must be followed as written. This Court has
consistently declined invitations to disregard unambiguous statutory language to reach a desired
outcome not supported by the language of the statute. Such is the case with the argument made
by the Regans. Regans urge this Court, contrary to its clear holdings, to construe unambiguous
language in LC. § 63-1009 to avoid an outcome which they characterize as unjust.
Regans ask this Court to consider the legislative intent of the 2016 amendment to LC.§
63-1009 to interpret the prior statute to conclude that an easement is not an encumbrance.
Supplemental Brief, pp. 7-12.

However, that approach ignores the proper steps of statutory

interpretation, wherein the Court must give effect to unambiguous statutory language without
further engaging in statutory construction. Saint Alphonsus Reg'! Med. Ctr., 159 Idaho at 86-87,
356 P.3d at 379-80; LC. § 73-113(1). The current legislature's explanation of its former body's
historical intent cannot supplant the application and effect of the clear and unambiguous statutory
language contained in the prior statute 4 . Therefore, the current statements of the legislature do not
control the interpretation of LC. § 63-1009. The plain language of the statute provides that the
Orphan Parcel was conveyed free of encumbrances, which includes Regans' claimed prescriptive
easement.

When the fonner LC.§ 63-1009 was written, the legislature presumably knew of the Court's interpretation of
encumbrances as such cases were decided long before the fonner version ofl.C. § 63-1009 was adopted.
4
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Prescriptive Easement is an
to use

land of another for a

that is

not inconsistent with the general use of the property by the owner." Abbott v. Nampa School Dist.
131, 119 Idaho 544, 548, 808 P.2d 1289, 1293 (1991). An easement can be an encumbrance

embraced in LC. § 55-613 based upon the holding in Hoffer discussed above. An easement can
be an encumbrance under the holding in Hunt discussed above when it diminishes the land's value.
An easement can be an encumbrance under Newmyer, supra, if it impairs the value and usefulness
of the land, and the right to the use was not granted for the purpose of benefiting the land itself or
increasing its value.
The district court was correct when it concluded "[t]he plain language in Idaho Code
Section 63-1009 is clear." 43848 R p. 75. The district court committed no error when it concluded
the Regans' prescriptive easement claim was an encumbrance because it was not essential to the
enjoyment of the Orphan Parcel and did not enhance the value of the land. 43848 R p. 75. Regan
failed to present the district court with any evidence that the prescriptive easement was essential
to the Owens' enjoyment of the Orphan Parcel or enhanced the Orphan Parcel's value. 43848 R
pp. 45-47, 72. To the contrary, Jeff Owen testified that a prescriptive easement across the Orphan
Parcel was not essential to the use and enjoyment of the Orphan Parcel, and detracted from the use
and enjoyment of the Orphan Parcel because it increased traffic and prevented the Owens'
complete and free use of the parcel. 43848 R pp. 28-29, 71. The district court was also provided
deposition testimony from Brent Regan who "couldn't say" if the easement enhanced the value of
the Orphan Parcel for the Owens. 43848 R pp. 33, 71.

At summary judgment, the district court was presented with undisputed facts and correctly
applied LC. § 63-1009 to those facts. Therefore, the district court's final judgment dismissing
Regans' prescriptive easement claim should be affirmed.
B.

The Trial Court Properly Rejected Regans' Policy Arguments Against
Applying I.C. § 63-1009 as Written

The district court was correct in construing Idaho Code Section 63-1009 as written because
the statute was unambiguous. "When the statutory language is unambiguous, courts must give
effect to the legislature's clearly expressed intent without engaging in statutory construction." Saint
Alphonsus Reg'! Med. Ctr., 159 Idaho at 86-87, 356 P.3d at 379-80 (emphasis added).

When a statute is unambiguous, there is no reason to consult legislative history or other
extrinsic evidence "for the purpose of altering the clearly expressed intent of the legislature." City
of Sun Valley, 123 Idaho at 667, 851 P.2d at 963. If the statute as written is socially or otherwise

unsound, the power to correct it is legislative, not judicial." Ver ska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg'! Med.
Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 892-93, 265 P.3d 502, 505-06 (2011) citing In re Estate of Miller, 143 Idaho

565, 567, 149 P.3d 840, 842 (2006). Even if this Court believes that an unambiguous statute as
written is absurd or produces absurd results, this Court does not have authority to revise the statute
or interpret it differently. Ver ska, 151 Idaho at 896, 265 P .3d at 509.
For instance, in Sims v. ACI Nw., Inc., 157 Idaho 906,342 P.3d 618,625 (2015) in response
to policy arguments from ACI Northwest and the Idaho Land Title Association to interpret a statute
other than written, this Court stated "any change to the statutory procedure for mechanic's lien
enforcement is best suited for the legislature." Sims, 157 Idaho at 906, 342 P.3d at 625. A harsh
result for ACI, who lost its mechanic's lien, but that is the correct relationship between the
judiciary and the legislature, and the relationship this Court should maintain on this appeal.

district court recognized the proper branch of government to enact and modify
it

"[t]he rigid language

statute may create inequitable or

oppressive results, however, it is not the province of the trial court to rewrite or impose an
application contrary to the clearly stated language." 43848 R p. 75. Despite the policy arguments
raised by the Regans and the claim of inequitable results should the trial court be affirmed, this
Court has made it clear that it will apply an unambiguous statute as written. This Court should
reject Regans' policy arguments and affirm the district court's dismissal of Regans' prescriptive
easement claim.
C.

The Trial Court Correctly Rejected Argument Based on Foreign Law

The district court was correct in rejecting arguments based on foreign law to interpret LC.
§ 63-1009 because the statute is clear and unambiguous. The goal of statutory interpretation is to

ascertain legislative intent. State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863,866,264 P.3d 970,973 (2011). "When
the statutory language is unambiguous, courts must give effect to the legislature's clearly
expressed intent without engaging in statutory construction." Saint Alphonsus Reg'l Med. Ctr., 159
Idaho at 86-87, 356 P.3d at 379-80 (emphasis added). When a statute is unambiguous, there is no
reason to consult legislative history or other extrinsic evidence "for the purpose of altering the
clearly expressed intent of the legislature." City ofSun Valley, 123 Idaho at 667, 851 P.2d at 963.
Likewise, foreign law is not controlling in this state and should only be used when
"confronted with matters of first impression involving Idaho statutes, this Court may glean insight
from the interpretations of sister states concerning similar or identical statutes." Curlee v.
Kootenai Cty. Fire & Rescue, 148 Idaho 391, 396, 224 P.3d 458, 463 (2008) (emphasis added).

Even then, the foreign law is only persuasive and this Court may refose to adopt the foreign
construction. Id.

Regans argue that interpreting "encumbrances" to exclude easements would "place Idaho
among the majority of courts in other jurisdictions holding that a tax sale does not extinguish prior
vested easements." Appellants' Opening Brief, p. 17. However, because the language of LC. §
63-1009 is plain and unambiguous as discussed above, there is no need to consult sources extrinsic
to the statute. Furthermore, the foreign authority cited by Regans is not based on a similar or
identical statute to LC. § 63-1009, and therefore should not be considered by this Court in its
analysis.
None of the foreign law cited by Regans is based on a statute similar or identical to LC. §
63-1009. Appellant's Opening Brief, pp. 17-19; compare Marshall v. Burker, 162 H.H. 560, 34
A.3d 705 (H.H. 2011); Hearn v. Autumn Woods Office Park Prop. Owners Ass 'n, 757 So.2d 155
(Miss. 1999); Alvin v. Johnson, 241 Minn. 257, 63 N.W.2d 22 (Minn. 1954). Those cases are not
based on statute, but simply state common law. The district court recognized the same when it
said "[i]t is well recognized that the law of foreign jurisdictions is not controlling and the Court is
precluded from considering the foreign law where the law in Idaho is clear." 43848 R p. 74. This
Court has no reason to consider the common law of foreign jurisdictions in applying a clear and
unambiguous Idaho statute. This Court should reject Regans' invitation to apply foreign law, and
should affirm the district court's final judgment dismissing the Regans' prescriptive easement
claim.

IV.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT TO OWENS WITHOUT CONSIDERING IDAHO CODE SECTION
55-603 BECAUSE THAT ISSUE WAS NEVER RAISED TO THE DISTRICT
COURT AND IDAHO CODE SECTION 63-1009 CONTROLS IN THE CASE OF
CONFLICT
Regans claim error due to the district court's failure to consider LC.§ 55-603 in its decision

to grant summary judgment. Application of LC. § 55-603 was never raised to the district court.

29

if it had been raised, LC.§ 63-1009 controls over LC.§ 55-603 because it is a more specific
and recent statute.
This Court has consistently held that it "will not consider issues that are raised for the first
time on appeal." Row v. State, 135 Idaho 573, 580, 21 P.3d 895, 902 (2001); State v. Fodge, 121
Idaho 192, 824 P.2d 123 (1992). Whether the district court's application of LC. § 63-1009
conflicts with and violates LC. § 55-603 was never raised below. Regans admit the same in their
Opening Brief: "the trial court did not receive argument on or address in its opinion whether the
easement passed with the tax sale pursuant to Idaho Code section 55-603." Appellants' Opening
Brief, p. 12. Since this Court does not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal, the Court
should not consider whether the district court's final judgment violated or conflicted with LC. §
55-603.
If this Court is inclined to entertain this new issue on appeal, the Court should uphold the

district court's final judgment because it relied upon the appropriate controlling statute. There is
a longstanding and foundational rule of statutory construction that when two statutes conflict, the
more specific statute controls over the more general statute. Ausman v. State, 124 Idaho 839, 842,
864 P.2d 1126, 1129 (1993); Estate of Collins v. Geist, 143 Idaho 821, 827, 153 P.3d 1167, 1173
(2007); Gooding Cty. v. Wybenga, 137 Idaho 201,204, 46 P.3d 18, 21 (2002); Tuttle v. Wayment
Farms, Inc., 131 Idaho 105, 108, 952 P.2d 1241, 1244 (1998); Richardson v. One 1972 GA1C
Pickup, 121 Idaho 599, 602, 826 P.2d 1311, 1314 (1992); Walker v. Shoshone County, 112 Idaho

991, 994, 739 P.2d 290,293 (1987); Mickelsen v. City of Rexburg, 101 Idaho 305,307,612 P.2d
542, 544 (1980); Guillard v. Department of Employment, 100 Idaho 647, 650, 603 P.2d 981, 984
(1979); State v. Roderick, 85 Idaho 80, 84,375 P.2d 1005, 1007 (1962); John Hancock lvfut. Life
Ins. Co. v. Neill, 79 Idaho 385,396,319 P.2d 195, 199 (1957).

related rule
statute

controL Roe v.

construction is that when two statutes conflict, the more recent
128 Idaho

917 P.2d
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996); Tomich v. City

of Pocatello, 127 Idaho 394, 400, 901 P.2d 501, 507 (1995); Mickelsen, 101 Idaho at 307, 612

P.2d at 544; Dana, Larson, Roubal & Assocs. v. Board ofComm'rs of Canyon County, 124 Idaho
794, 801, 864 P.2d 632,639 (Ct.App.1993).
LC. § 55-603 and its predecessor statutes have existed unchanged since enacted in 1887.
See Russell v. Irish, 20 Idaho 194, 118 P. 501, 503 (1911 ); Appellants' Opening Brief, p. 12. Idaho

Code Section 55-603 relates to the continuing existence of existing easements following a transfer
of real property. In contrast, LC. § 63-1009 as it previously existed was enacted in 1996 and
related only to transfers of real property by tax deed conveyance. It created a specific exception
to the general rule in LC. § 55-603. Idaho Code Section 63-1009 was limited to transfers of real
property by tax deed for the previous 20 years. Because LC.§ 63-1009 was a more recent statute
and more specific regarding the effect of conveyance by a tax deed on the continuing existence of
an encumbrance, it was controlling over LC. § 55-602.
Further, Regans recognize where two statutes on the same subject "can be reconciled and
construed as to give effect to both, no repeal occurs, and it is the duty of the courts to so construe
them." State v. Roderick, 85 Idaho 80, 84,375 P.2d 1005, 1007 (1962). Regans also acknowledge
that courts must interpret statutes "under the assumption the legislature knew of all legal precedent
and other statutes in existence at the time the statutes were passed." City of Sandpoint Jndep.
Highway Dist., 126 Idaho 145, 150, 879 P.2d 1078, 1083 (1994).

Following these established principles of statutory construction support the trial court's
decision. Interpreting LC. § 63-1009 to convey real property free of easements that are not
essential to the enjoyment of the land or do not enhance the land's value does not implicitly repeal

1

§ 55-603 as implied by Regans. Appellants' Opening Brief, 13-14. It simply created an

exception to the general rule set forth

LC. § 55-603 in the limited circumstances of a conveyance

of real property by tax deed. Both statutes are still given effect and there is no nullification or
repeal. Further, it follows the axiom that the legislature knew the meaning of encumbrances based
upon prior case law when it passed LC. § 63-1009. Therefore, the district court did not err in
holding that the Regans' prescriptive easement on the Orphan was an encumbrance extinguished
by tax deed and this Court should affirm the dismissal of Regans' claim for prescriptive easement.

V.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR BY FAILING TO ADDRESS THE
VALIDITY OF THE TAX DEED
Regans claim error below because the district court failed to find the tax deed invalid. The

district court did not err in giving full effect and validity to the tax deed because its validity was
never challenged. As previously argued, this Court has repeatedly held that it "will not consider
issues that are raised for the first time on appeal." Row, 135 Idaho at 580, 21 P.3d at 902; Fodge,
121 Idaho at 192, 824 P .2d at 123. The validity of the tax deed conveying the Orphan Parcel to
Kootenai County was not raised below. Therefore, this Court should not consider the issue on
appeal.
Further, even if the tax deed issue was raised below, Regans argument lacks merit. Regans
acknowledge LC.§ 63-1006(6)(c) provides that a tax dee can include the tax number. The Owens
tax deed at the top contains the tax assessors number immediately below the Exhibit "A", and
identifies it as Parcel# 50N03W-27-7160.
Further, the legal description does not reference "extrinsic evidence" as argued by Regans.
Regans rely upon Wasden v. Foell, 63 Idaho 83, 89, 117 P.2d 465,468 (1941) for the proposition
that the legal description must not refer to other recorded documents because such references are
extrinsic facts. This was not the holding of Wasden v. Foell. In Wasden v. Foell, supra, this Court

found a tax deed legal description was insufficient because it referenced a plat that did not exist.
Court

Wasden v. Foell examined the recorded plats to make its determination the legal

description was insufficient. It was not critical of a deed that referenced recorded plats. It was
critical of a deed that referenced no recorded plat.
In Meneice v. The Blackstone Mining Company, Ltd, 22 Idaho 451, 121 P.2d 450 (1942),
the Court again examined the sufficiency of a legal description.

The Court found a legal

description was insufficient if one could not examine the record and acquire sufficient data to
enable him to locate the land taxed. Id. at 417-48, 121 P.2d at 451-452. Following this opinion,
this Court issued the opinion that "[t]he applicable rule is that a description in an assessment, and
tax proceedings based thereon, is sufficient if it contains enough information to enable one to
locate the land taxed. Wilson v. Jarron, 23 Idaho 563, 131 P. 12; Meneice v. Blackstone Mining
Co., 63 Idaho 413, 121 P.2d 450." Kelson v. Drainage Dist. No. 10 Boundary County, 77 Idaho
320, 291 P.2d 867, 869 (1955).
In this matter, the record demonstrates a surveyor was able to examine the deed and record
to create a survey of the parcel. 40848 R p. 283. Further, the calls in the deed all reference recorded
instruments. 40848 R p. 70. The record shows information sufficient to enable one to located the
Orphan Parcel as the land taxed.

VI.

REGANS' DUE PROCESS ISSUE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED BY THIS
COURT
Another claim of error by Regans is the district court's failure to properly address their due

process claim. Regans failed to develop a due process claim in their opposition memorandum to
Owens' summary judgment other than a statement made in passing that termination of the alleged
prescriptive easement would be inequitable and a taking of property without due process or just

compensation. It was merely mentioned in passing such a result would be inequitable. R 43848 p.

Regans contend on appeal that their due process rights were violated because they were
not given any notice of the tax sale of the Orphan Parcel. Appellants' Opening Brief, p. 26. Yet
Regans provide this Court with no citation to evidence in the record to support their claim they did
not receive notice of the tax sale. That is because the record is devoid of any such evidence.
Accordingly, this Court must reject Regans' due process argument because it lacks factual support
and was not properly raised below. For these reasons, this Court should affirm the district court's
dismissal of the Regans' prescriptive easement claim.
VII.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT TO OWENS WITHOUT CONSIDERING RELOCATION OF THE
EXPRESS EASEMENT

Regans assert the trial court erred by failing to consider relocation of the express easement
to the Orphan Parcel on remand. The district court did not err in granting Owens' Third Motion
for Summary Judgment without considering relocation of the express easement. The trial court
previously relocated the easement based upon the deed reformation, which was reversed by this
Court in the first appeal. Regan, 157 ldaho at 761-762, 339 P.3d at 1165-1166. Following remand,
the Regans did not raise the issue again.
A.

The Relocation of the Express Easement Resulting from Deed Reformation
was Decided by this Court in its Prior Decision

One of the issues raised in the first appeal was whether the district court erred in reforming
the Owens' deed, which resulted in relocating the express easement to the Orphan Parcel. Regan,
157 Idaho at 761-762, 339 P.3d at 1165-1166. The Court rejected the mutual mistake and deed
reformation arguments for several reasons. Id. at 762-765, 339 P.3d at 1166-1169. This Court
vacated the portion of the district court's amended judgment reforming the Owens' deed. Id. at

339 P.3d at 1169. This Court remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent
with its decision. Id.
Regans' sole remaining claim raised in their complaint on remand was their claim to a
prescriptive easement claim for the benefit of four parcels of land they owned. 43848 R p. 23.
Fallowing remand, Regans did not raise the issue of relocation of the easement to the district court,
nor did they seek to amend their complaint to add such a cause of action.
One reason this Court rejected the Regans' deed reformation argument on the first appeal
is because that claim was extinguished by the tax deed for the Orphan Parcel to Kootenai County:
The tax deed conveyed absolute title to the County free of encumbrances ... When
the county received the tax deed to the Orphan Parcel, that cut off any claim to
reform the Owen Parcel so that it included the Orphan Parcel The county was
at that point the absolute owner of the Orphan Parcel. When the Owens later
purchased the Orphan Parcel, they received the title that the county had.
Regan, 157 Idaho at 764,339 P.3d at (emphasis added). This Court has already held that all claims

of Regans to reform the Orphan Parcel have been extinguished by tax sale. This issue has been
decided and is inappropriate here on the second appeal.
B.

The Issue of Easement Relocation was Not Raised Below Following Remand

Regans further complain the district court failed to consider relocation of the easement
under LC. § 55-605. The district court did not err in granting summary judgment for Owens
without considering whether the express easement could be relocated pursuant to LC. § 55-605
because that issue was never raised below. Again, this Court has repeatedly held that it "will not
consider issues that are raised for the first time on appeal." Row, 135 Idaho at 580, 21 P.3d at 902;
Fodge, 121 Idaho at 192,824 P.2d at 123.

Following remand from the first appeal the sole remaining claim for trial was Regans'
prescriptive easement claim. Regans never raised relocation of their express easement below,
either through a motion to amend the complaint or in opposition to Owens' summary judgment.

as authority to support relocation of their express easement.

§
§

13 as a

for

easement.

Relocation of the express easement was not within the scope of remand and was not an issue raised
below. Therefore, this Court should not consider that issue here on appeal.
C.

Idaho Code Section 55-605 is Inapplicable to the Facts of this Case

If the Court is inclined to consider whether application of Idaho Code § 55-605 requires
relocation of Regans' express easement, the Court will conclude that LC. § 55-605 is inapplicable
to the facts of this case. Idaho Code § 55-605 is the codification of the doctrine of after-acquired
title: "Where a person purports by proper instrument to convey or grant real property in fee simple,
and subsequently acquires any title or claim of title thereto, the same passes by operation of law
to the grantee or his successors." PHH Mortgage Servs. Corp. v. Perreira, 146 Idaho 631, 638,
200 P.3d 1180, 1187 (2009). The key element to that doctrine is the presupposition that "the
person giving the deed did not have title when purporting to convey the property." Id.
In this case, the doctrine of after-acquired title codified at LC. § 55-605 is inapplicable
because the record is devoid of any facts that a predecessor in interest to the Owens ever gave a
deed for the property without having title at the time of conveyance. There is no evidence in the
record that when the Original Grantors 5 deeded property to Harold and Jean Smart they did not
hold title to the property at the time of conveyance. See 40848 R. pp. 30-32. Likewise, there is no
evidence in the record that anyone in the subsequent chain of title for the Owen parcel deeded
property without holding title at the time of conveyance. See 40848 R. pp. 30-32.

"Original Grantors" refers to Alexander H. Hargis, John W. Acheson, Jr., and R.C. Collins (or the co-personal
representatives if his estate, M. Eileen Acheson and /or John W. Acheson, Jr., after M. Eileen Acheson passed away)
as referenced in this Court's first decision. See Regan v. Jeff D., 157 Idaho 758,760,339 P.3d 1162, 1164 (2014).
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Regans argue that the Original Grantors intended to convey a parcel to the Smarts that
included the Orphan parcel, but due to a mistake in the legal description, failed to do so.
Appellants' Opening Brief, p. 34. That argument is essentially an argument for deed reformation.
It has absolutely no relationship to the doctrine of after-acquired title. The Original Grantors
conveyed property they owned and there is no evidence in the record of a purported conveyance
of property not actually owned by the grantor at the time of conveyance, that was later acquired
by that grantor. Accordingly, had Regans raised Idaho Code Section 55-605 as an issue before the
district court, it would not have changed the district court's analysis. Likewise, this Court should
reject Regans' argument and affirm the district court's final judgment.
After acquiring the tax parcel, the Owens combined it with the parcel they previously
owned for purposes of tax assessment only. A.R. 411. The form used for this purpose specifically
informed Owens that the single tax assessment was not a zoning permit which altered the existence
of the lot in any manner. Id. Despite this fact, Regans present a convoluted argument this action
relocated the easement because it created one parcel. It did not. It merely created one tax bill.
Further, it did not relocate the easement as a matter of law.
D.

Idaho Code Section 55-313 is Inapplicable to the Facts of this Case

Although never raised below, Regans now argue the district court erred in ruling in favor
of Owens because the district court never considered LC. § 55-313 as a basis to relocate the express
easement to the Orphan Parcel. If this Court is inclined to entertain this argument on appeal, it
must conclude that it has no factual basis in this case.
Idaho Code Section 55-313 gives a servient estate owner the right to relocate an easement
for motor vehicle access across the servient estate owner's property if the relocation does not injure
or obstruct the use of the dominant estate(s):

RELOCATION OF ACCESS. Where, for motor vehicle travel, any access which
is less than a public dedication, has heretofore been or may hereafter be, constructed
across private lands, the person or persons owning or controlling the private lands
shall have the right at their own expense to change such access to any other part of
the private lands, but such change must be made in such a manner as not to obstruct
motor vehicle travel, or to otherwise injure any person or persons using or interested
in such access. (Emphasis added.)
I. C. § 5 5-313. This statute allows an affirmative action by the servient owner to change an existing
easement and provide an alternate easement for the dominant estate at the choice and expense of
the servient estate. It gives no rights to the dominant estate owner to alter the easement.
In this case, there is no evidence in the record that Owens, after acquiring the Orphan
Parcel, relocated the express easement to the Orphan Parcel. Owens have consistently admitted in
this case that their property is burdened by an express easement benefitting one of Regans' parcels.
40848 AR pp. 163-171. After Regans' received summary judgment on the express easement for
the benefit of Parcel II, Regans developed this express easement for their use.
There is no evidence in the record that after acquiring the Orphan Parcel the Owens
relocated the express easement to the Orphan Parcel. In fact, the contrary evidence exists in the
record. Regans brought a preliminary injunction to force Owens to allow them to use the Orphan
Parcel because following the Owens' acquisition of the Orphan Parcel, they fenced and gated the
Orphan Parcel which prevented Regans' use. See 40848 5/31/12 Preliminary Hearing Transcript
and 40845 6/4/12 Preliminary Hearing Transcript. Owens opposed the issuance of the preliminary
injunction to Regans because they had an express easement which provided access. Id. Any use
by Regans of the Orphan Parcel was pursuant to the trial court's issuance of a preliminary
injunction. 40848 R pp. 92-94.

VIII. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN DESCRIBING THE LOCATION OF
THE EXPRESS EASEMENT IN THE FINAL JUDGMENT BECAUSE THERE
WAS NO RELOCATION OF THE EXPRESS EASEMENT

Regans claim the trial court's final judgment improperly described the location of the
express easement. The district court did not err in describing the location of the express easement
in Paragraphs 1 and 3 of the final judgment. As addressed in Section VII above, this Court reversed
the trial court's previous judgment which resulted in the express easement being relocated to the
Orphan Parcel due to the deed reformation. It was not error for the trial court to exclude from its
consideration on remand Regans' claims of mutual mistake and the intent of the original grantors,
i.e. the deed reformation issues. It would have been error for the trial court to disregard the
directive of this Court on remand.
Further, relocation of the easement was not within the scope of matters remanded to the
district court.

Regans' previous summary judgment, which was granted, requested entry of

judgment that Regans' had an express easement across Owens' parcel Regans' only remaining
claim following remand was their prescriptive easement claim. At no time following remand did
Regans request to reform their pleadings to include a cause of action for relocation based on the
statutes they now raise, nor did they raise the issue when Owens moved for summary judgment on
remand.
Finally, none of Regans' new relocation arguments have merit. As previously discussed,
had Regans raised these issues to the trial court, they would not have prevailed. This Court should
affirm the district court's final judgment, including the location of the express easement.

IX.

REGANS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO COSTS OR ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
Regans cite to Idaho Code § 12-121 as a statutory basis for an award of attorney fees on

appeal. Appellants' Opening Brief, pp. 3 8-3 9. As discussed above, an award of attorney fees under
I.C. § 12-121 is only appropriate when "the Court is left with the abiding belief that the appeal was
brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation." Chavez, 146 Idaho

at

1

P.3d at 1049. Owens defense in this appeal is not frivolous. To the contrary, Owens

the Court with vast amounts of case law, statute, and facts from the record that support
this Court's affirmation of the district court's final decision. Accordingly, Regans are not entitled
to their attorney fees on appeal.
CONCLUSION

Before this litigation commenced, in a letter to Owens' counsel, Regans' counsel claimed
" ... I am informed that Mr. Regan actually prefers the north 30 feet of parcel #3600 for the location
of an access road. That location is several feet higher than the existing road and would therefore
have better drainage in the winter." AR. 266. Owens admitted in their answer Regans had an
express easement in this location. Regans constructed a road in this location after receiving a
summary judgment that their express easement was in that location. It defies logic and exemplifies
frivolous and vexatious litigation for Regans to continue to pursue claims at this point that the
easement should cross the Orphan Parcel.
For the reasons stated above the Owens respectfully request this Court affirm the final
judgment of the district court and grant an award of reasonable attorney fees to Owens for the
defense of the frivolous issues presented by Regans on this appeal.
SUBMITTED this 29th day of July, 2016.
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